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There is an increasing debate on the potential use of the signals arising from 
financial markets as a complement to the information set available to 
supervisors. Following this stream of research, this paper provides for the first 
time some empirical evidence on Italian banks, using a unique dataset matching 
accounting ratios, equity-market variables and supervisory judgements. More 
specifically, we analyse the behaviour of four well-used equity-based indicators 
for the Italian banks whose shares were listed on the Milan stock exchange 
between 1995 and 2002 and look at the correlation across banks and across 
indicators, verifying what type of signal (if any) different variables are able to 
convey. Moreover, we investigate whether equity-based indicators provide 
additional information for supervisors with respect to the set of data they 
usually rely on, assuming the supervisory ratings as a benchmark. 
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MARKET AND SUPERVISORY INFORMATION:  




Banking supervision is based on a wide range of information, typically acquired through 
the periodic statistics due to supervisors by banks and the inspections that are carried out with 
a lower frequency on the m ain premises of the intermediaries. On the one hand, off-site 
analyses provide the supervisors with a continuous and systematic picture of intermediaries’ 
activity, on the other hand on-site examinations enable supervisors to acquire detailed 
information o n specific aspects of the banks’ operating framework, such organisations or IT 
systems. Therefore, these two instruments are complementary, providing supervisory 
authorities with a deep knowledge of single banks and, indirectly, of the banking system as a 
whole. 
In recent years an intense debate has developed among academics and supervisors about 
the potential use of the signals coming from financial markets as a complement to the 
information already available to supervisors, the main idea being that “market participants 
have an incentive to look through reported accounting figures to the real financial condition of 
a bank and to price a bank’s securities based on their best estimates of the distribution of the 
security’s future cash flows”
1. For this reason the picture supervisors are able to draw on the 
risk profile of banks could (in theory) be integrated with the information that financial 
markets, if efficient, tend to promptly reflect in prices. In other words, even though 
supervisors do have a big amount of insider information, financial markets might be more 
rapid in updating their evaluations.  
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Thus, what is under discussion is not the supremacy of one information with respect to the 
other, but understanding whether the signals coming from financial m arkets can represent for 
supervisors an additional tool to identify weak banks.  
This issue seems to be relevant mainly for large banks, whose portfolios are considered to 
be more “opaque” and therefore more difficult to be evaluated, and represents only one of the 
several points of view from which “market discipline” can be studied. Indeed, it is possible to 
distinguish between “market monitoring”, regarding the hypothesis that investors (able to 
perceive the true risk profile of the intermediaries) promptly incorporate in prices the new 
information coming from the market, and “market influence”, which reflects the ability of 
outside claimants (such as investors) to induce managers to effectively modify their actions 
(Bliss and Flannery, 2002)
2.  
According  to the former definition (“market monitoring”), the first stream of research has 
widely concentrated on bond spreads, particularly on subordinated notes and debentures 
(SND). In effect, economic theory suggests that subordinated bondholders have a strong 
incentive to monitor the evolution of the bank’s riskiness, given that – when a crisis occurs – 
their exposure is not covered by deposit insurance and the reimbursement of their capital is 
subordinated to that of all the other creditors. For this reason bondholders are considered to 
have an objective  – the limitation of risk  – which is broadly similar to supervisors’ one; in 
other words, bondholders care more about the downside risk of the bank’s performance than 
the upside one. On the contrary, shareholders  – given their limited responsibility  – have no 
limits to the potential gain and, at the same time, a predefined limit to the loss; therefore, they 
can be willing to increase the risk profile of their investment with no negative effects on share 
prices. Based on this argument, in recent years mandatory subordinated debt issuance by 
banks has also been recommended as a new tool for supervisors to discipline banks (e.g. 
Calomiris, 1997). 
More recently the attention has shifted on equity markets. First, there  is broad consensus 
that they are more efficient in elaborating and incorporating new available information; 
second, equity-based data are more frequent and easier to be collected, as there are more 
                                                 
2  The relevance of these issues is confirmed by the reform of the Capital Accord for banks proposed by the Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision. The new regulation will be based on minimum capital requirements 
(pillar 1), a supervisory review process (pillar 2) and specific disclosure requirements aiming at enhancing 
market discipline (pillar 3).
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banks whose shares are listed on stock exchanges than banks issuing SNDs on regulated 
markets; third, recent studies have provided evidence on the fact that bondholders do not have 
strong incentive to run a costly monitoring activity if they perceive supervisory authorities 
adopted a too-big-too-fail policy; finally, although conceptually simple, the implementation of 
bond spreads is not straightforward, i.e. different bonds issued by the same bank may yield 
different estimates of the spread.  
This paper contributes to the second stream of research, by providing f or the first time 
empirical evidence on Italian banks based on a unique dataset matching accounting, market 
and supervisory information. We believe that such an analysis is particularly noteworthy 
given the relatively recent development of the Italian financial market. More specifically, the 
research addresses two main questions: 
I.  What kind of information does the Italian stock market provide on the financial 
condition of intermediaries?  
II.  Given their higher frequency with respect to quantitative data, can equity-based 
indicators provide supplementary information for supervisors?  
In order to answer these questions, we analyse the behaviour of four well-used equity-
based indicators for the Italian banks whose shares were listed on the Milan stock exchange 
from 1995 to 2002. In particular, we look at the correlation across banks (for the same 
indicator) and across indicators (for the same bank), verifying what type of signal (if any) 
different variables are able to convey. Furthermore, following the methodology  adopted in the 
recent literature, we test for Italy the ability of market variables to add informative value to 
quantitative supervisory data, thus reflecting, at least to a certain extent, the qualitative 
information employed by the Bank of Italy in assigning supervisory ratings (PATROL). Our 
main goal is therefore to identify some source of information that, even if less precise, is 
available on a timelier basis. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 contains a survey of the literature, focussing 
on the research that provides empirical evidence on the equity market. In section 2 the 
behaviour of four well-used equity-based indicators is described, paying particular attention to 
the correlation analysis. In section 3 a logistic model is estimated,  where the dependent   5 
variable is the level of PATROL ratings and the explanatory variables are – in addition to the 
balance-sheet ratios – some of the selected market indicators. 
 
1. A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
There is an extensive academic literature regarding the complementarity of supervisory 
and market information. The bulk of this stream of research has focused on the U.S. 
secondary bond markets, in order to analyse the ability of subordinated bond spreads to signal 
banks’ soundness (for a detailed review see, among the others, Flannery, 1998). The main 
findings are that bond spreads tend to increase when firm’s riskiness increases. To our 
knowledge, there is only one paper (Sironi, 2003)  which looks at the European market of 
subordinated notes and debentures (SND); studying the characteristics of over 1,800 bond 
issues performed by European banks between 1988 and 2000, it confirms that bond spreads 
reflect the different risk profiles of the issuers. 
More recently, the attention has been focused also on t he signals arising from equity 
markets and several studies have been dealing with the usefulness of equity-based information 
and its contribution in improving the supervisors’ knowledge of intermediaries’ financial 
condition. Given the focus of our paper,  some of the main empirical literature belonging to 
this stream of research is surveyed below. 
Berger, Davies and Flannery (1998) compare the supervisory judgements on Bank Holding 
Companies (BHCs)  – represented by the rating assigned after the inspections  (BOPEC
3)  – 
with the evaluations incorporated in some market variables (e.g. Moody’s  ratings on 
subordinated bonds, equity abnormal returns); the goal of the exercise is to understand the 
timeliness and accuracy of different kinds of information. Their results suggest that 
supervisory data and those incorporated in the agencies’ ratings are complementary, to the 
extent that the latter help improve BOPEC forecast; by contrast, the relationship between 
                                                 
3 In the U.S., the Federal Reserve is the supervisory body of the bank holding companies. The general 
inspections are usually carried out yearly and they mainly focus on the analysis of credit quality, internal audit, 
business plan After the inspection, the FED assigns its rating (BOPEC, Banks Subsidiaries, Other non bank 
subsidiaries, Parent company, Earnings and Capital adequacy) that reflects intermediary’s overall soundness. It 
shifts from 1 to 5 as the overall performance of the BHC worsens; the supervisory rating is strictly 
confidential. Conversely, the CAMELS (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, 
Sensitivity to risk) is the on-site rating assigned once a year on a solo basis.    6 
supervisory and market variables is weak. The authors explain the inconsistencies in the 
results with the different incentives of the various players involved in banks’ monitoring. 
Supervisory authorities and rating agencies would be mainly concerned on preventing the 
default risk, since they somehow protect debtors’ interests; by contrast, shareholders would 
primarily care of the rise in bank’s value, even if achieved by an increase in risk taking.  
Similarly, Krainer and Lopez (2001) examine whether market variables such as equity 
returns and probabilities of default (KMV’s expected default frequencies, EDF￿
4) can be 
used by supervisors for assessing the soundness of BHCs. In particular, they analyse the 
ability of equity-based indicators to anticipate BOPEC’s downgrading, thus improving the 
performance of the early warning system already in use, which is based exclusively on 
balance-sheet and supervisory data
5.  
The exercise is divided into several steps. From the behaviour of equity abnormal returns 
they infer that, in the quarters preceding an upgrading, the indicator is significantly different 
from zero; by contrast, it is negative before BOPEC’s downgradings and not significantly 
different from zero when supervisors don’t modify their evaluations on the banking group. 
This result is confirmed also when the one-year EDF is considered as the explanatory 
variable.  
In order to evaluate the insights that market information may provide, they start estimating 
an ordered logit model in which the BOPEC rating is firstly predicted by the balance-sheet 
variables that proxy the main profiles of banking operations; the model is then extended by 
including equity-based indicators (i.e. abnormal return, EDFs,  volatility) in order to test their 
significance and the potential improvement in forecasting accuracy. Econometric results 
reveal that volatilities and abnormal returns are both significant, however their inclusion do 
not appreciably improve the performance of the model.   
Gunther et al. (2001) estimate an ordered probit model for determining the ability of EDFs 
in forecasting the level of BOPEC assignments, after supervisory data are included. Results 
                                                 
4 The EDF (expected default frequency) represents the default probability of a firm in a specified time horizon. 
5 The model (System for Estimating Examiner Ratings, SEER) allows forecasting the failure of a bank two years 
ahead and the CAMELS rating one quarter ahead. In particular, the model used to predict CAMELS rating is 
estimated quarterly in order to select troublesome banks in the interval between two inspections and possibly 
strengthen supervisory activity.    7 
show that, notwithstanding the significance of EDF’s coefficient, the explanatory power of 
the model is not higher than that of the regression that only considers balance-sheet variables. 
The econometric exercise is then repeated using the downgrading of the BOPEC rating as the 
dependent variable, rather than its level; unlike the previous specification, the model 
including both balance-sheet and market variables shows a better forecast accuracy. 
Similarly, the exercise performed by Curry et al. (2003) aims at assessing the contribution 
of some equity-based indicators in forecasting future BOPEC’s changes as against balance-
sheet and supervisory data. Using a logit model, three different specifications are estimated 
(including respectively balance-sheet variables, market data and finally the entire set of 
regressors). Furthermore, in order to capture the impact of the business cycle the sample is 
divided into three sub-periods:  1988-1992 (slowdown), 1993-1995 (recovery), 1996-2000 
(boom).  
Results are different in the three sub-samples. In expansionary and recessionary phases 
several balance-sheet  and market variables (primarily the volatility, the abnormal return, the 
market leverage and turnover) are significant and their sign is correct. The specification 
including only market-based indicators shows a lower performance with respect to the model 
that considers balance-sheet and supervisory data; however, when both the subsets of 
variables are included the explanatory power of the regression increases. The empirical 
evidence is not equally clear-cut for the period 1993-1995. In a nutshell, the main findings do 
not allow concluding that market operators are able to catch BOPEC’s changes before the 
supervisory authorities; nonetheless, market information seems to make the forecast more 
precise, at least in certain phases of the business cycle.    
In order to sort out if market variables can be considered as leading indicators of banks’ 
distress, Gropp et al. (2002) consider as a proxy of banks’ fragility the rating assigned by the 
agencies rather than the BOPEC; given that in Europe very few banks formally declared 
bankruptcy, they used the downgrading of a bank to below C in the Fitch/Ibca individual 
rating. Unlike previous papers, they don’t include control variables, since they assume that 
balance-sheet indicators are already incorporated in market information. By contrast, a 
dummy variable is considered in order to test if the likelihood of public bailouts represents an 
incentive for reducing market discipline.    8 
Two equity-based indicators are used: an equity-based “distance-to-default“ ( à la Merton) 
and subordinated bond spreads. The main findings – based on European banks for the period 
1991-2001  – show that both variables have a predictive power for bank fragility. More 
particularly, the distance-to-default has got good predictive power in the 6 -18 months 
preceding the downgrading by the agencies; conversely, in the quarter prior the rating change, 
coefficients result significant only for the banks characterised by a low likelihood of public 
bailouts. On the contrary, bond spreads are able to convey some signal only when the time 
horizon is more limited. Again, market perception of a likely public intervention is relevant: 
indeed the variable is significant only for those banks, generally small sized ones, with a low 
probability of bailout.   
Finally, the informative content of several market variables is thoroughly assessed by 
Baumann et al. (2003), looking specifically at the behaviour of six equity- and bond-based 
indicators: bond spreads, credit default swap (CDS) prices
6, equity prices (returns), implied 
volatilities and implied probabilities of default (PDs)  – both derived from option-pricing 
theory  – and the interest rate spread of deposit held by other financial companies over a risk 
free rate. The sample is made by seven major UK-owned banks, representing on a 
consolidated basis for more than 90 per cent of the total assets of UK banks.  
Unlike equity-based measures, bond spreads and CDS prices are highly positively 
correlated across banks, suggesting that they are presumably more sensitive to systematic 
shocks and that many of the events that influence bank riskiness are common to all  banks; on 
the contrary, real equity prices and implied PDs may be more sensitive to bank specific 
factors or noisier than the debt-based variables. Moreover, they find that the selected 
indicators rarely provide unambiguous signals during periods of stress; the provided 
explanation is that either the variables are sensitive to different type of information or there 
are some data problems, such as illiquid markets or the influence of noise trading. Finally, the 
econometric evidence show that market indicators move in the expected direction with 
contemporaneous movements in balance-sheet measures of bank risk; furthermore, bond 
                                                 
6 In a CDS, debt holders pay insurance to a third party for protection in case the issuer defaults (because of his 
failure to repay or, alternatively, because of any other credit event as specified in the contract); the CDS price 
indicates the value of the swap, determined by the probability of failure of the bank and the recovery rate. 
With respect to bond spreads, CDs prices are easier to observe directly and to be collected.   9 
spreads are more sensitive to macroeconomic risk than bank specific ones, whereas the 
reverse is for equity-based indicators. 
All in all, the main findings of the recent literature are not completely unambiguous: the 
usefulness of different variables turns out to be strongly dependent on the specifications of the 
model, the hypotheses assumed on their behaviour, the width of the event window. 
Nonetheless, the market seems to provide a correct signal, possibly anticipating supervisors’ 
perception, on the changes in the soundness of banks. Besides, it is worth mentioning that the 
empirical evidence is primarily focused on the US a nd UK markets; to our knowledge, there 
are no analyses carried out on relatively less developed markets, where the role of equity-
market information might be less evident.   
 
2. DO DIFFERENT INDICATORS PROVIDE DIFFERENT SIGNALS?  
In this section we analyse the behaviour of a set of equity-based indicators for the Italian 
banks listed on the Milan stock exchange between 1995 and 2002; we focussed on this period 
mainly because until the half of the Nineties only a limited number of banks was listed on the 
Italian stock exchange. 
In line with the pattern observed in the main industrial countries, in the last decade the 
Italian banking system experienced an impressive process of consolidation. Between 1990 
and 2000 there were 513 concentrations, involving intermediaries representing 45 per cent of 
total assets. The degree of concentration of the banking system, as measured by the market 
share of the five largest groups, grew from about one-third up to 54 per cent; accordingly, the 
number of banks declined from 1,100 to 841. This process was  accompanied by the 
privatisation of the major banks and their listing on the stock exchange; the market share of 
intermediaries controlled by the state or foundations fell from 68 per cent at the end of 1992 
to 12 per cent in 2000. 
In the same period, the Italian stock exchange has significantly developed. At the end of 
2000 the capitalisation of the Italian stock market represented 70 per cent of gross domestic 
product, with respect to 18 per cent at the end of 1994. The capitalisation of the banking 
sector increased as well: its weight on total market capitalisation rose from 16.5 to 24.6 per 
cent. This is the result of the bullish trend observed in the financial markets of major countries   10
in the second half of the decade and o f the increased number of Italian listed banks, passed 
from 31 to 40. At the end of 2002 they represented about 80 per cent of the consolidated 
assets of the banking system
7. 
Following some previous research on the Italian market, banks are classified as “big caps”, 
“small caps”, “co-operative banks” and “asset managers”,  according to their market value, 
legal status and specialisation in specific business areas
8. Collecting the data from 
Datastream, we computed the following variables: 
1.  Equity prices; the m ain advantage of this variable derives from its easy availability; on the 
other hand, economic theory suggests that the movement of stock prices only provides 
with an outlook on the interest of investors to the single companies and not necessarily 
with a p roxy of the issuer’s risk profile. In other words, as mentioned in Baumann et al. 
(2003), “the relationship between equity prices and bank default is not clear cut; (…) this 
implies share prices might rise rather than fall as the riskiness of assets increase”. 
2.  Daily returns and abnormal returns (computed as the difference between the former and 
the return of the index of the banking sector). 
3.  Historical volatility, computed as exponential moving average following the methodology 
suggested by RiskMetrics
9. On a general basis, the volatility results to be higher for big 
caps and asset managers. On the contrary, around specific events (such as the Russian 
crisis in summer 1998 and the 9/11 terroristic attack) it is quite similar across all the banks 
and higher than the average.  
4.  Distance-to-default (DTD), derived from Merton’s option-pricing model (1974) and 
widely used in the financial community to compute the probability of default of single 
companies within a predetermined time horizon
10. The main idea is that  equity can be 
                                                 
7 Market variables, collected from Datastream, are adjusted to take into account M&A operations; balance-sheet 
data, derived from supervisory reports, are not adjusted except in the case of major operations. 
8 See, for instance, the semi-annual Reports on the Italian listed banks’ shares by Prometeia. 
9 This volatility measure is different from the simple moving average because different weights are used in 
computing the standard deviation. The volatility is therefore more sensitive to recent shocks: the higher the 
value given to the decay factor (between 0 and 1; equal to 0.94 in this paper, as suggested by RiskMetrics), the 
higher the weight of past observations and, therefore, the less prompt the adjustment to more recent conditions. 
10 From an economic point of view, a company is in default when its own funds go to zero and therefore the 
market value of the assets is not sufficient to repay the liabilities. Therefore, the probability of default depends,   11
modelled as a call option on the firm with a strike price equal to the book value of the 
debt; therefore, option-pricing theory can be used to derive the market value and volatility 
of assets from the observable equity value and volatility. G iven these values and defining 
the Default Point (DP) as the asset value below which the company is assumed to become 
insolvent, DTD is computed as the difference between the market value of the assets and 
DP with respect to the volatility of the assets (which reflects the volatility of the business 
of the company)
11. 
A first type of signal we can derive from equity-based data is the exposure of the banking 
system to common risk factors, as proxied by the degree of correlation of each of the four 
indicators  across banks: i.e. a positive and high correlation coefficient might reflect the 
sensitivity of all banks to risk factors of the same nature. Tab. 1 contains all the pairs of inter-




The sign of  the coefficients is positive in all cases whereas the magnitude of the correlation 
is quite different across the variables. It is equal to 0.51 for equity prices, much lower (0.22) 
for returns. Unlike returns, the correlation coefficient for equity prices  is presumably driven 
also by the long-term pattern of the stock market and the trend of consumer price index. The 
low value shown by the distance-to-default seems to reflect the specific characteristics of the 
single banks, such as leverage and the riskiness of the assets, which play a big role in the 
construction of the variable itself. This result is consistent with the evidence found by 
Baumann et al (2003). 
                                                                                                                                                        
given the stock of debts, on the future level of firm’s assets, which in turn reflects the actual and perspective 
profitability, and its volatility. Assets’ riskiness is affected by different types of risks: credit, market and 
operational risk. Option pricing theory enables to get the firm’s value. For details, see Crosbie (1999). 
11 Gropp et al (2002) show that equity-based distance-to-default, together with subordinated bond spreads, have 
two desirable properties to be leading indicators of bank fragility: they are complete (they reflect the three 
main drivers of default risk: earnings expectations, leverage and asset risk) and unbiased (they reflect these 
risks correctly).   12
In order to assess the stability of correlation coefficients over time, we divided the whole 
sample in three different sub-periods, which can be broadly associated with three different 
phases of the Italian stock market: boom (January 1995  - June 1998), stability (July 1998 – 
June 2000), decrease (July 2000  – December 2002). Tab. 1 shows that daily returns and 
volatilities have a quite stable correlation coefficient across banks, whereas prices and DTDs 
show a more differentiated pattern. More specifically, equity prices of all the listed banks in 
our sample result very much correlated in the boom phase, unlike the decrease phase and, 
even more, the stability phase. Intuitively, this seems to be consistent with the idea that in 
presence of financial “euphoria” the market pays greater attention to common factors (i.e. 
macroeconomic scenarios, industry trends) whereas in other phases investors tend to be more 
selective in their investment decisions. 
Focussing on the different categories of banks (Tab. a1, in the Appendix), “big caps” show 
much higher correlation coefficients for all variables, mainly because of the larger market 
capitalisation and higher exposure to systemic factors. A peculiar pattern characterises the 
behaviour of market variables for “asset managers”: i.e. very high coefficients for equity 
prices and volatility (mainly due to the common  dependence on the performance of financial 
markets) and lower values for returns and, to a larger extent, DTDs. 
Another type of information that can be derived from market variables is the different 
signal conveyed by each of them; in fact, even though they are all based on equity data, they 
are characterised by growing complexity. We therefore examined whether movements in the 
four variables described above are correlated for each bank with the expected sign. Tables 2 




Correlation coefficients are quite low, restricted within a range of  -0.1 and +0.1. This result 
is consistent with the findings of similar studies and provides a confirmation that the signals 
conveyed by the selected variables are significantly different from each other, even though 
market expectations are in all cases somehow captured.    13
The only coefficient which results significantly different from zero is that between DTD 
and volatility ( -0.46),  in line with the economic framework behind the DTD: the higher it is 
equity volatility the lower the distance of the company from the default point. Similar 
findings can be observed for the different categories of banks. On the contrary, only for “big 
caps” the correlation coefficient between prices and DTD is positive whereas the correlation 
analysis between volatility and equity prices does not provide with unique evidence. 
Overall, equity-based indicators seem to convey some hints on banks’ exposure to 
common risk factors, especially for “big caps” and when the stock market is in a bullish 
phase. However, the type and the magnitude of this signal depend to a large extent on the 
nature of the single indicators. 
 
3. MARKET DATA AND SUPERVISORY EVALUATIONS: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
In this section we analyse the relationship of some of the indicators described above with 
the judgements that the Bank of Italy assigns on a yearly basis to single banks (PATROL 
ratings). 
 
3.1 Data description 
PATROL ratings. – They represent the synthetical judgements assigned yearly to banks by the 
Bank of Italy; they are strictly confidential. In assigning the supervisory rating, supervisors 
virtually use all the relevant available information according to standardised procedures; the 
output of the analysis is therefore a combination of quantitative scoring and human 
judgement. Similarly to U.S. CAMELS, the PATROL rating system focuses on five 
components of the bank performance: capital adequacy (PATrimonio), profitability 
(Redditività), credit risk (Rischiosità), management (Organizzazione) and liquidity 
(Liquidità). Following this approach, both the five profiles and the overall condition of the 
intermediary are rated. Ratings can vary from 1 (sound banks) to 5 (distressed banks)
12.  
                                                 
12 For details on the PATROL rating system, see Serata (1997) .   14
In this paper, we consider the PATROL rating as a benchmark, under the hypothesis that it 
incorporates all the relevant aspects of banks’ operations. Moreover, we determine the timing 
of the other indicators with respect to the instant (usually September) in which supervisory 
ratings are assigned
13.  
Market variables. – Bearing in mind the results described in the previous section, we selected 
the following market indicators: 
•  Abnormal return (AR), which is calculated as the difference between the return o n the 
bank’s shares and that of the banking index; we consider four different time windows (1, 
3, 6 and 12 months from the date in which the PATROL is assigned) in order to 
understand the pattern of market prices prior the “event”; 
•  Distance-to-default (DTD), calculated at t, t-3, t-6 and t-9 with respect to the “event”;  
•  Distance-to-default (MDTD), computed as the average of the monthly DTD in the 3, 6 
and 9 months before the assignment of the PATROL. 
Balance-sheet data. – We selected some of the balance-sheet variables more widely employed 
in off-site supervisory analyses. Since analysts rely on both annual and semi-annual reports, 
variables are lagged by 9 months (December) and 3 months (June). The selected variables, 
grouped by technical profile, are listed below: 
•  Riskiness: bad debts / total loans (RISKST), flow of new bad debts / performing loans 
(RISKFL), loan losses / operating profit (LLOSS). These ratios aim at capturing 
respectively the overall riskiness of bank’s portfolio (stock credit risk indicator), the 
bank’s ability to select new borrowers (flow of funds credit risk indicator) and the 
incidence of the worsening of debtors’ financial conditions on the P/L account. 
•  Profitability: net income / capital and reserves (ROE), net income / gross income 
(NETINC), income stemming from financial services / gross income (FSERVIN), 
operating expenses / gross income (EFFIC). These variables measure the overall 
                                                 
13 Since the data on annual profit-and-loss accounts become available at the end of April (quarterly information 
are already available at the end of February) and the banks submit the evidence referring to the first half of the 
year at the end of August, the PATROL model is run in Autumn.   15
profitability of the bank, the contribution of the different sources of earnings to the net 
income (diversification) and the weight of operating costs on profitability (efficiency). 
•  Capital adequacy: supervisory capital / risk-weighted assets (SOLVER), tier 1 capital / 
risk weighted assets (TIER1R).  The former allows assessing bank’s capability to comply 
with the minimum regulatory requirements; the latter, even if not provided for by the 
legislation, is an indicator widely used by market operators (such as rating agencies) and 
increasingly included in the supervisory analyses as well. 
•  Size: computed as  the logarithm of total assets (SIZE). It is a control variable; the log-
form takes into account the potential non-linear relationship between size and supervisory 
judgements. 
Table 3 provides a summary of the variables we considered in the analysis and the data 
sources we used. Although we largely relied on supervisory statistics, most of the indicators 




3.2 The univariate analysis 
Given the relatively small number of Italian listed banks, the analysis has been carried out 
cross-section in order to maintain a sufficiently large number of observations. Moreover, 
panel techniques would have been not fully reliable since many listed banks have been 
involved in M&A operations  in the sample period. Therefore, the time perspective has been 
eliminated in the analysis: the reference date is not relevant, what actually matters is the lag 
structure of the variables. As a consequence, a single bank can be included in the dataset more 
than once, i.e. at different points in time.  
Tables a3 and a4 show the mean and median values of the explanatory variables grouped 
by PATROL class; it is worth noting that the sample size for the extreme classes (1 and 5) is 
quite small.   16
It is not surprising that the balance-sheet variables are consistent with supervisory 
assessments; banks with higher rating show, on average, better credit quality, higher 
profitability and capital adequacy levels.  
In particular, among the riskiness variables, the ratio of the stock of bad debts to total loans 
(RISKST) increases when the PATROL rating worsens; similar evidence arises from the flow 
of funds riskiness indicator (RISKFL), even in presence of an ambiguous behaviour for class 
3. 
With reference to profitability, the return on capital and reserves (ROE) and the incidence 
of operational costs on gross income (EFFIC) behave as expected. It is interesting to 
underline that the contribution of income from services to gross income is higher for banks 
with a better PATROL, confirming the benefits arising from diversification of earnings. 
Capital adequacy indicators (SOLVER and TIER1R) essentially reflect supervisory 
judgements, even if with a less clear-cut pattern.  
Bank’s size does not seem to be a relevant factor in t he assignment of PATROL ratings; 
however, it is worth reminding that the sample is mainly formed by medium and large sized 
banks. 
As regards market variables, findings are more complex. In general, distance-to-defaults 
reflect quite clearly PATROL levels ( except for classes 1 and 5): on average, the worse the 
supervisory ratings the lower the DTD (i.e. the distance to the default point); no significant 
differences arise by considering different lags. The behaviour of the average DTD is instead 
less clear-cut, albeit the median values are consistent with PATROL levels.  
The pattern of abnormal returns is consistent with PATROL ratings when narrower event 
windows are considered (1 and 3 months before the event):  AR1 and AR3 decrease as 
supervisory assessment  worsens. That may reveal that equity price performance tend to some 
extent to anticipate the information included in the PATROL rating. By contrast, signals 
deriving from the abnormal returns are less clear when wider intervals are considered (6 and 
12 months); this is likely the result of the higher level of “noise” they incorporate.  
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3.3 The econometric results 
In order to verify the ability of market variables to add information beyond that available 
to supervisors, we estimated an ordered logit model i n which the PATROL rating is the 
dependent variable and  the balance-sheet and market-based indicators are the regressors
14. 
Since PATROL ratings are assigned on an annual basis, the exercise is aimed at investigating 
the possibility to exploit for supervisory purposes market-based data, which are generally 
more timely than supervisory statistics and quicker in incorporating news, even if 
(presumably) less precise.  
We estimated the three following models: 
•   Prob(Patroli=k) = a + Sbibalance-sheet variable + mi  
•   Prob(Patroli=k) = a + Sdimarket variable + mi  
•   Prob(Patroli=k) = a + Sbibalance-sheet variable + Sdimarket variable + mi  
where k=2,3,4;  i=1, 2,…n 
 
Given the substantial stickiness of PATROL ratings in the sample, we decided to use as the 
dependent variable the level of PATROL ratings rather than their changes 
(downgrading/upgrading)
15. Therefore, in the exercise we modelled the probability to obtain a 
positive judgement (low PATROL). 
Since the two extreme classes have been excluded because of their small size, the 
dependent variable may assume three values (2, 3, 4)
16.  
It is worth emphasising that our model is based on a static “contemporaneous” relationship 
between the dependent and the explanatory market variables. Indeed, we believe that at this 
                                                 
14 For details on the logistic models and, in general, on the discrete choice models see, among the others, 
Maddala (1983). 
15 In fact, having too many “no change” values for the dependent variable might affect the robustness of the 
results. In particular, a variable might turn out to be s ignificant just because it explains few events of 
supervisory rating change. 
16 As a robustness check we also estimated the model including the extreme classes. Results are not substantially 
different.   18
stage  it is better to sort out which are the most meaningful market variables rather than trying 
to distinguish between contemporaneous and leading indicators. In other words, the model is 
intended to explain PATROL level rather than to forecast it. 
More specifically, we estimated five different specifications of the model: we started 
including only balance-sheet variables (lagged by 3 and 9 months), then we considered only 
market-based indicators and, finally, we added the whole set of variables
17. The most 
parsimonious model has been chosen via general-to-simple approach, i.e. starting from a 
plausible general specification and eliminating insignificant regressors at successive stages; 




In specifications 1 and 2, which only include balance-sheet indicators, the three riskiness 
variables (RISKST, RISKFL, LLOSS) and the return on equity (ROE) are significant; by 
contrast, the other profitability indicators and capital adequacy ratios are not significant at all 
conventional levels. All the significant variables show the expected sign, except RISKFL 
whose behaviour was not unequivocal in the univariate analysis as well. Consistently with the 
evidence from the descriptive statistics, bank’s size (SIZE) does not seem  to have any 
explanatory power in the assignment of PATROL level. This result is different from the 
findings contained in some previous research which, however, used supervisory rating 
downgrading as the dependent variable; therefore, it is not astonishing  that bank’s size is not 
significant in determining PATROL level even if it is a factor that may, in principle, reduce 
the probability of downgradings.  
As mentioned above, the assessment of balance-sheet variables is very relevant in the 
assignment of PATROL ratings. It is therefore not surprising that both specifications are 
satisfactory in terms of goodness of fit: the adjusted R-square is equal to 47 per cent when the 
variables are lagged by 9 months (December) and to 41 per cent when they are lagged by  3 
                                                 
17 It is worth pointing out that the meaning of the numeric index associated with each variable is different for the 
two sets of indicators. For balance-sheet variables it reflects the lag, for market indicators it represents the 
time-horizon over which they are computed.    19
months (June). Also the value of the Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma  indicator is satisfactory 
in both the specifications (0.70 and 0.65 respectively). They have been thus used as 
benchmarks in order to assess the performance of the models that also include market-based 
data. 
With reference to specification 3, that only considers market variables, we found that the 
coefficient of the distance-to-default is statistically different from zero whereas the abnormal 
return is not. This confirms that the former reflects quite accurately the bank’s risk profile 
while the latter is reasonably affected by shareholders’ incentives. The signs of the 
coefficients are positive (except for the average DTD):  the probability to obtain favourable 
PATROL ratings increases as the distance-to-default rises. The value of the adjusted R -square 
(13 per cent) and that of the gamma (0.32) confirm that equity-based data do provide 
information, even though they are – as expected – less powerful than balance-sheet indicators. 
Once tested  the explanatory power of market information, we re-estimated the model 
including the two sets of variables at the same time (specifications 4 and 5), in order to verify 
that market indicators are not redundant and their inclusion contributes to improve the fit of 
the model. We found no substantial differences in the selection of the significant variables and 
in the signs of the coefficients; the only remarkable change is that in specification 5 the proxy 
for bank’s size (SIZE) becomes significant at 10 per  cent level with a negative sign and the 
flow of funds riskiness indicator (RISKFL) turns out to be not significant. The joint use of 
both types of variables makes it possible to significantly improve the overall goodness of fit: 
in specification 4 and 5 the adjusted R -square is equal to 64 and 66 per cent respectively, in 
line with the results achieved in previous research focussed on other countries.  
Most importantly, the number of concordant pairs of observations increases (to around 90 
per cent in both  the specifications) as well as the gamma statistics (around 0.8), reflecting 
higher predictive performance of the model that includes market variables. 
Some further evidence of the contribution of market-based indicators is derived from the 
comparison of s pecifications 4 and 5 with specifications 1 and 2 respectively: different tests 
show that the former specifications do have an higher explanatory power than the latter ones. 
The model that uses, beyond market variables, balance-sheet indicators lagged by  9 months 
results the one that better fits the data; the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the   20
Schwarz’s criterion (SC) are more favourable, with values significantly lower than those of 
the other specifications.  
As regards the economic significance of the regressors, we performed an  ad hoc analysis, 
given that the marginal effects of the regressors on the probabilities are not equal to the 
coefficients in models with discrete dependent variables. 
Specifically, in order to assess the effect of a change  in the explanatory variables on the 
PATROL probabilities, we calculated the partial derivative of the estimated probability and 
assumed a 10 per cent increase of each of the regressors from its median value,  coeteris 
paribus. Then, given that the logistic  function provides a cumulative probability, i.e. in our 
case the probability to obtain a PATROL score lower or equal to a specific outcome, we 
computed the difference between two cumulative probabilities, in order to obtain a measure of 
the impact that a c hange in one of the regressors has on the probability of having a specific 
PATROL score. The regressors are those resulted to be significant in specification 4. We 
repeated the exercise using the 10
th and the 90
th percentile as alternative starting values of the 
regressors.  
Looking at table 5 we observe that, for instance, a 10 per cent increase of DTD determines 




It is worth noticing that the simulated shocks on the regressors do not have a significant 
impact on the probability of having a PATROL equal to 4; the main reasons being that only 
few banks reporting such a score are included in the sample and that for these banks, as 
shown in Tables a3 and a4 in the Appendix, the median values are not dramatically different 
from better quality classes. 
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In recent years an intense debate has developed among academics and practitioners on the 
potential usefulness of market-based data in improving supervisory a uthorities’ knowledge of 
the intermediaries’ financial conditions. Given that the bulk of previous findings primarily 
refer to the U.S. market, we focused on the Italian equity market and selected the banks listed 
on the Milan stock exchange between 1995 and 2002; at this stage we did not analyse bond 
spreads. 
In principle, it is possible to build up several market-based indicators according to the 
different availability and frequency of the data. They generally differ in complexity and result 
to provide different information on the market perception of the bank’s riskiness: of course 
there is an understandable trade-off between timeliness and accuracy. In fact, the descriptive 
analysis clearly showed that different indicators do provide different information on bank’s 
exposures to either idiosyncratic or common risks. On the one hand, consistently with 
economic theory stock prices are scarcely able to reflect the evolution of bank’s riskiness, 
furthermore they are excessively affected by market trends and the evolution of consumer 
prices. On the other, the distance-to-default based on the option pricing theory seems to be a 
variable well suited for catching bank’s specific riskiness. 
This evidence has been confirmed by the comparison of equity-based variables with the 
supervisory ratings assigned each year by the Bank of Italy (PATROL ratings). DTD is 
basically consistent with supervisory ratings; on the contrary, equity returns provide reliable 
insights only when they refer to time windows close to the supervisory assignment while they 
are more “noisy” for wider time horizons, making their interpretation more difficult. 
Econometric results confirmed the informative content of equity-based variables and their 
complementarity with supervisory information: they p rovide with a picture of the 
intermediary’s soundness which, even if less accurate, is more easily and frequently available. 
In the various specifications we estimated to capture PATROL level, market indicators turned 
out to be highly significant and showed the expected sign; furthermore, they contributed to 
improve the performance of the model.  
   22
In sum, our analysis presents some first evidence for Italy of the usefulness of market 
information for supervisory purposes. Monitoring the evolution of equity markets may 
therefore represent a valuable tool for supervisors in order to acquire some  preliminary data 
on the changes of the risk profile of listed banks, before the ordinary supervisory statistics 
become available. In a macro-prudential perspective, this might enrich  the assessment of 
financial stability.   23
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Period Prices Returns Volatility DTD
1995 - 2002 0.51 0.22 0.43 0.28
1.1995 - 6.1998 0.83 0.22 0.47 0.1
7.1998 - 6.2000 0.21 0.21 0.46 0.17
7.2000 - 12.2002 0.38 0.23 0.43 0.3
Correlation across banks




DTD Prices Returns Volatility
DTD 1 -0.06 -0.04 -0.46










































financial services income / gross income
net income / gross income
net income / (capital + reserves)
loan losses / operating income
tier1 capital / risk weighted assets 
(including market risk)
supervisory capital / risk weighted assets 
(including market risk)
operating expenses / gross income
















sign. coeff. Wald 
test
sign. coeff. Wald 
test
sign. coeff. Wald 
test
sign. coeff. Wald 
test
sign.
intercept 1 0.60 0.53 1.51 5.52 ** 0.58 3.89 ** 1.26 1.22 7.01 4.09 **
intercept 2 4.63 18.28 *** 5.22 37.34 *** 3.19 51.69 *** 5.90 15.87 *** 11.32 9.45 ***
BALANCE SHEET 
VARIABLES
RISKST9 - -0.18 3.53 * -0.47 7.95 ***
SOLVER9 +
SIZE9 +/-
RISKFL9 - 0.10 5.92 ** 0.13 6.00 **
EFFIC9 -
LLOSS9 - -0.05 10.47 *** -0.07 10.41 ***
ROE9 + 0.15 5.07 ** 0.19 5.12 **
FSERVIN9 +
RISKST3 - -0.32 16.41 *** -0.44 12.64 ***
SOLVER3 +
SIZE3 +/- -0.39 3.16 *
RISKFL3 - 0.05 4.23 **
EFFIC3 -
LLOSS3 - -0.05 6.64 *** -0.06 5.09 **




DTD + 0.18 3.38 * 0.43 7.43 *** 0.47 7.99 ***
DTD3 +
DTD6 +
DTD9 + 0.43 10.92 *** 0.69 5.98 ** 0.56 8.91 ***
MDTD3 +
MDTD6 + -0.83 13.16 ***






































Balance sheet t-3 
and market















Specific. 1: Specific. 2: Specific. 3: Specific. 4: Specific. 5:
Balance sheet t-9
In all the specifications, the dependent variable (PATROL) may assume three values since we excluded the two extreme classes; we estimated the probability to get a
positive evaluation (low PATROL). For each model, the most parsimonious specification has been choosen by the general-to-simple approach.
*, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 per cent level respectively.
Wald test has a Chi-square distribution.
A pair of observations with different values of the dependent variable is concordant if the observation with the lowest value (best PATROL rating) shows the highest
event probability; otherwise, the pair of variables is discordant. A pair of observations may be neither concordant nor discordant. Goodman and Kruskal's gamma












P10 -1.6287 1.5968 0.0319
P50 -4.6257 4.4842 0.1415
P90 -7.1817 7.0533 0.1284
P10 0.1115 -0.1094 -0.0022
P50 0.3068 -0.2973 -0.0095
P90 2.5129 -2.4680 -0.0449
P10 -0.8677 0.8507 0.0170
P50 -3.1329 3.0372 0.0958
P90 -6.7858 6.6645 0.1213
P10 1.4981 -1.4688 -0.0294
P50 3.8779 -3.7593 -0.1186
P90 6.0849 -5.9761 -0.1088
P10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
P50 3.3384 -3.2363 -0.1021
P90 6.6297 -6.5111 -0.1185
P10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
P50 5.1841 -5.0256 -0.1586
P90 8.0370 -7.8934 -0.1437
P10 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
P50 -7.4937 7.2645 0.2292









Effect of a 10% regressor increase on estimated probabilities. Absolute changes of the
















Period Prices Returns Volatility DTD
1995 - 2002 0.8 0.48 0.77 0.59
1.1995 - 6.1998 0.93 0.45 0.56 0.66
7.1998 - 6.2000 0.38 0.44 0.78 0.97
7.2000 - 12.2002 0.87 0.81 0.77 0.33
1995 - 2002 0.82 0.32 0.77 0.03
1.1995 - 6.1998 0.85 0.12 0.71 0.09
7.1998 - 6.2000 0.84 0.17 0.67 0.08
7.2000 - 12.2002 0.85 0.46 0.76 0.01
1995 - 2002 0.79 0.18 0.33 0.26
1.1995 - 6.1998 0.9 0.21 0.48 0.23
7.1998 - 6.2000 0.16 0.2 0.37 0.35
7.2000 - 12.2002 0.22 0.12 0.32 0.17
1995 - 2002 0.63 0.24 0.5 0.45
1.1995 - 6.1998 0.78 0.29 0.65 0.6
7.1998 - 6.2000 0.38 0.25 0.42 0.32
7.2000 - 12.2002 0.64 0.25 0.48 0.41  
COOPERATIVE BANKS











DTD Price Return Volatility
DTD 1 0.27 -0.01 -0.55
Price 1 0.12 -0.22
Return 1 0
Volatility 1
DTD 1 -0.03 0.017 -0.25
Price 1 0.1 0.13
Return 1 0.23
Volatility 1
DTD 1 -0.25 -0.11 -0.6
Price 1 0.11 0.37
Return 1 0.18
Volatility 1
DTD 1 -0.25 -0.04 -0.38
Price 1 0.16 0.22
Return 1 0
Volatility 1  
COOPERATIVE BANKS
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Table a3
VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5
Mean 0.14 3.71 5.90 11.41 33.50
Median 0.14 3.41 5.71 10.99 33.33
Mean 0.01 3.90 6.40 10.93 30.39
Median 0.01 3.79 5.98 10.86 31.54
Mean 0.17 3.72 2.78 5.21 10.88
Median 0.17 0.95 1.29 1.72 4.18
Mean 0.07 2.57 2.42 4.90 8.12
Median 0.07 0.87 1.31 1.80 4.43
Mean 1.74 11.90 22.29 36.15 22.28
Median 1.74 11.17 19.95 29.36 0.00
Mean 14.22 15.62 28.09 69.81 52.82
Median 14.22 14.45 25.97 76.18 87.70
Mean 20.67 15.10 7.85 3.32 0.00
Median 20.67 11.07 6.09 2.32 0.00
Mean 11.60 11.09 6.31 3.65 0.00
Median 11.60 8.85 5.76 2.37 0.00
Mean 26.43 21.59 14.15 4.30 15.82
Median 26.43 18.41 12.39 2.48 0.00
Mean 20.55 19.30 12.97 5.27 0.00
Median 20.55 15.38 10.11 3.37 0.00
Mean 63.93 49.73 38.66 35.18 31.22
Median 63.93 45.11 35.99 34.07 20.95
Mean 58.60 46.53 35.15 32.42 37.96
Median 58.60 42.06 34.07 32.80 30.03
Mean 35.46 52.82 59.68 67.50 65.48
Median 35.46 55.51 62.67 62.53 81.30
Mean 42.50 55.29 62.01 73.34 80.89
Median 42.50 58.61 64.08 69.24 84.90
Mean 14.82 16.18 14.89 8.93 9.12
Median 14.82 13.13 13.09 7.95 8.85
Mean 16.75 16.78 14.17 9.14 9.25
Median 16.75 13.60 12.82 8.41 9.25
Mean 11.30 13.00 11.74 6.18 5.78
Median 11.30 10.44 9.15 5.12 6.05
Mean 12.50 13.47 11.29 6.54 6.19
Median 12.50 10.37 9.09 5.18 6.19
Mean 16.62 15.75 15.72 16.72 15.62
Median 16.62 15.81 15.63 16.70 15.60
Mean 16.59 15.68 15.70 16.73 15.67
Median 16.59 15.77 15.63 16.66 15.72
Nr. observations 2 102 88 11 5
BALANCE SHEET INDICATORS:






























VARIABLE 1 2 3 4 5
Mean 0.34 2.01 2.20 -0.44 -4.78
Median 0.34 0.98 0.21 1.23 -1.50
Mean 4.45 5.42 4.16 3.11 -8.05
Median 4.45 5.53 2.03 4.35 -9.50
Mean 16.03 2.83 2.35 2.48 -25.48
Median 16.03 2.57 2.03 0.04 -25.92
Mean -7.96 7.31 -0.58 9.84 -2.79
Median -7.96 2.87 -3.97 13.97 8.98
Mean 1.99 3.00 2.75 2.42 1.25
Median 1.99 2.79 2.12 2.15 1.19
Mean 3.24 3.45 3.32 3.65 2.38
Median 3.24 3.45 3.58 3.31 2.74
Mean 2.51 2.75 2.63 2.26 1.58
Median 2.51 2.91 2.26 1.78 1.49
Mean 2.97 3.12 2.61 1.66 1.43
Median 2.97 3.06 2.58 2.08 1.29
Mean 3.13 3.30 3.27 3.36 1.78
Median 3.13 3.54 3.22 2.60 1.99
Mean 3.15 3.13 2.98 3.37 1.85
Median 3.15 3.34 3.17 2.85 2.01
Mean 3.04 3.02 2.87 2.92 1.56
Median 3.04 3.07 2.79 2.68 1.74
Nr. observations 2 102 88 11 5
MARKET INDICATORS
by PATROL rating classes
AR1
AR12
AR3
AR6
DTD
DTD3
DTD6
PATROL
MDTD9
DTD9
MDTD3
MDTD6